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RESEARCH
Factors influencing the choice of  
a safe haven for offloading illegally caught 
fish: a comparative analysis of developed 
and developing economies
Nerea Marteache1*, Julie Viollaz2 and Gohar A. Petrossian2
Abstract 
Using data from 72 countries, this study focuses on factors that affect illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fish-
ing vessels’ choice of country to offload their catch, with a specific emphasis on the differences between developed 
and developing economies. The concept of choice-structuring properties is applied to analyze whether the following 
factors influence the selection of a country: concealability of vessels and illegally caught fish; convenience of the 
ports; strength of fisheries monitoring, control, and surveillance measures; effectiveness of country governance; and 
commitment to wildlife protection regulations. Results indicate that, rather than a country’s level of development, 
situational factors play a key role in what country IUU fishing vessels choose. IUU fishing vessels are more likely to 
offload illegal catch in countries with better port infrastructure and where concealability is easy to achieve because of 
high vessel traffic and large amounts of fish imports/exports; and they are less likely to offload their catch in countries 
with strong governance.
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Background
Developing economies generally suffer from more crime 
than developed economies (Lafree and Tseloni 2006; 
Wolf et al. 2014). They are important locations for trans-
national crimes, such as drug smuggling (Segopolo 1992) 
and human trafficking (Hatchard 2006; UNODC 2006), 
as well as a number of other crimes, including financial 
crimes like money laundering (Duffy 2000), and envi-
ronmental crimes, such as illegal dumping of hazard-
ous waste (Lipman 1999). Some of the reasons for these 
higher rates of crime are the breakdown of social cohe-
sion that stems from severe income inequality and pov-
erty (Bourguignon 2000; Wolf et  al. 2014), corruption, 
and the lack of law enforcement capacity (Svensson 2005; 
Olken and Pander 2011), all of which allow criminal 
actors to successfully commit crimes with little risk of 
arrest and prosecution (Hatchard 2006).
Environmental crimes, including wildlife crimes, also 
occur more frequently in developing economies. Apart 
from the factors mentioned above, the combination of 
developing economies’ wealth of biodiversity and devel-
oped economies’ problems with resource depletion 
(Doughty and Carmichael 2011) often creates a unidirec-
tional flow of illegal wildlife products from developing 
to developed economies where rich buyers are available 
(Duffy 2000; Fuller et al. 1987; Lin 2005; Popescu 2013). 
Adding to this problem, developing economies often 
delay implementing environmental regulations and con-
trols until their economy is prosperous, facilitating envi-
ronmental crimes and resulting in lasting damage to their 
ecosystems (Sachs1984–1985; Hatchard 2006).
Developing economies, which account for 50  % of 
global fish exports (FAO 2006), are especially affected 
by illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. 
They not only lose about $9 billion dollars to IUU fishing 
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annually (Black 2007), but illegal fishing operators also 
recruit crews in developing economies because they can 
take advantage of unregulated labor markets and mini-
mal controls on working conditions (EJF 2005). These 
crews are often subjected to such human rights abuses 
as financial exploitation and withholding of earnings, 
imprisonment aboard the vessel without food and water, 
and physical and verbal abuse (EJF 2010).
Beyond the economic and human rights problems it 
generates, IUU fishing is also a serious threat for spe-
cies conservation and global food and job security. 
About 4.5 billion people worldwide depend on fish for 
15–20 % of their daily animal protein intake, and 8 % of 
the global population, primarily from developing econ-
omies, works in the fishing industry (FAO 2010). As of 
2008, 85 % of the world’s fish stocks were fully exploited, 
over-exploited, or depleted, with scholars predicting 
a complete collapse of fish stocks by 2048 at this rate 
(EFTEC 2008; Worm et al. 2009). Lastly, IUU fishing ves-
sels are also increasingly involved in other illegal activi-
ties, including drug and migrant smuggling (UNODC 
2011). From an economic and social welfare standpoint, 
IUU fishing is a serious problem that is likely to continue 
unless successful solutions are found to curb it. Crimi-
nologists can play a key role in understanding the drivers 
and characteristics of IUU fishing, crafting crime preven-
tion solutions to protect the planet’s biodiversity, as well 
as addressing the ancillary economic and social problems 
IUU fishing causes.
Co rruption of fisheries’ officials and poor surveillance 
and enforcement of regulations for activities carried out 
in these countries’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs) have 
been cited among the facilitators of IUU fishing (Stand-
ing 2008; Palma 2010). They create an ideal environment 
for IUU fishing vessels looking to exploit developing 
economies’ plentiful marine resources (Palma 2010). The 
EEZs of developing economies are the primary origins 
of illegally obtained fish (HSTF 2006; MRAG 2008). This 
research focuses on the countries where the illegally 
caught fish are offloaded, and on the factors that make 
some destinations more attractive to IUU fishing vessels.
How is IUU fish offloaded?
To engage in IUU fishing, a fishing vessel must: (1) access 
the waters where the fish are, (2) remove the fish from the 
water, (3) transport the catch to the destination, and (4) 
offload the illegally caught fish at the destination’s port. 
Each of these steps must be completed without being 
detected and detained by the authorities, and obstructing 
any of these steps will jeopardize the entire fishing trip.
Existing criminological research tends to focus on step 
(2) of the crime commission process: the opportunities to 
remove the fish from water (Petrossian 2015; Petrossian 
and Clarke 2014). The present study, on the contrary, 
concentrates on the last step (4) of the crime: where the 
illegally caught fish is offloaded and why this destina-
tion is chosen. The only existing study that focused on 
this step (Petrossian et al. 2015) used the concept of risky 
facilities to explain what port characteristics facilitated 
vessel entry and offload of illegal catch. It found that IUU 
fishing vessels were more likely to visit free ports (ports 
exempt from certain laws and customs regulations) and 
ports with higher levels of daily general and fishing vessel 
traffic, and larger harbor sizes. They were also more likely 
to visit ports located in countries where illegal fishing, 
corruption, and less effective catch inspection programs 
were common.
Theoretical framework
The theoretical framework used in this study is the 
concept of choice structuring properties coined by Cor-
nish and Clarke (1987). These are the characteristics or 
properties of offenses that “provide a basis for selecting 
among alternative courses of action and, hence, effec-
tively structure the offender’s choice” (p. 935). They make 
crime attractive to one offender but not another based 
on his or her goals, character traits, background, and/or 
expertise, such as the skills and resources needed, or the 
amount of payoff (Cornish and Clarke 1987). The con-
cept stems from the rational choice perspective (Cornish 
and Clarke 1986), which states that when offenders plan 
a crime, they weigh the costs and rewards of commit-
ting the crime in a rational manner so as to maximize its 
rewards and minimize its costs (Felson and Clarke 1998). 
They are more likely to choose crimes that have a low risk 
of detection, are easy to commit, and provide what they 
consider a worthwhile reward.
Two recent criminological studies have used the con-
cept of choice structuring properties to understand the 
choices made by criminals. Pires (2011) classified choice-
structuring properties into (1) static properties, used to 
explain why poaching for the illegal parrot trade is popu-
lar in the neo-tropics; and (2) variance properties, used 
to explain why some species of parrots are poached more 
often than others. Static properties focus on the opportu-
nity structure of the crime, while variance properties are 
the factors weighed by the offender to make event-related 
decisions regarding the target, location, and tools, among 
other factors. Marteache (2012) focused on the variance 
properties of theft from luggage at airports to determine 
what airport characteristics made them more likely to 
experience this type of crime.
The current study
This study builds on previous research by focusing on fac-
tors that affect IUU fishing vessels’ choice of country to 
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offload their catch, with a specific emphasis on the differ-
ence between developed and developing economies. We 
compare what group of countries experience more visits 
from IUU fishing vessels. On one hand, the direction of 
the illegal wildlife trade in general, and of IUU fishing in 
particular, leads to the assumption that IUU fishing ves-
sels disproportionately visit developed economies. On 
the other hand, given the low enforcement capacity of 
developing economies, the fact that most IUU fishing 
happens in their EEZs, and the short life-cycle of caught 
fish, it is also possible that IUU fishing vessels prefer to 
offload their catch in developing economies. This study 
also examines what country characteristics facilitate the 
offloading of IUU fishing vessels’ illegal catch. Knowing 
what specific countries are the primary destinations for 
offloading illegally caught fish and what factors influence 
IUU fishing vessels’ choice of country can help target law 
enforcement resources to prevent financial and biodiver-
sity losses, as well as combat ancillary crimes committed 
by IUU fishing vessels.
It is expected that the choice structuring properties 
influencing IUU fishers’ decision to offload their catch in 
a particular country will be highly specific and depend 
heavily on the costs and rewards of committing the crime. 
This study identifies 5 variance choice structuring proper-
ties relevant to where IUU fishing vessels choose to offload 
their illegal catch. These are: the concealability of vessels 
and illegally caught fish; the convenience of the ports; the 
strength of fisheries monitoring, control, and surveillance 
measures (fisheries MCS); the effectiveness of country gov-
ernance; and the country’s commitment to wildlife protec-
tion regulations. Accordingly, it is hypothesized that:
1. Countries where it is easy to conceal not only ves-
sels at port (among heavy vessel traffic), but also 
the illegal catch (among the high volume of import 
and export of goods in general, and fish in particu-
lar), offer good opportunities to operate undetected. 
Therefore, IUU fishing vessels will choose to offload 
their catch in countries whose ports experience 
higher traffic of vessels, goods, and fish.
2. The abundance of marine resources, coupled with the 
quality of port infrastructure, affords the convenience 
of catching highly sought-after species and offloading 
it through a port with easy transport and access to 
target markets. Countries with these characteristics 
will experience a higher volume of visits by IUU fish-
ing vessels.
3. The existence of strong fisheries MCS is likely to deter 
or make it difficult for IUU fishing vessels to offload 
their catch. Countries where there is little oversight 
over fisheries-related activities, and where such for-
mal surveillance is weak, thereby allowing high levels 
of IUU fishing, will be preferred destinations for IUU 
fishing vessels.
4. Countries with poor governance are likely to offer 
low-cost, low-effort and high-reward criminal oppor-
tunities and will, therefore, be prime destinations 
for IUU fishing vessels to offload their catch. Politi-
cally unstable and violent countries are less capable 
of fighting IUU fishing in their waters and monitor-
ing the legality of offloaded fish. Similarly, the higher 
a government’s effectiveness, and the more adept a 
country is at controlling corruption within its bor-
ders, the better its capacity to prevent these crimes.
5. Lastly, the more conservation treaties and conven-
tions to which a country belongs, the more willing 
and active it is likely to be in protecting its wildlife, 
and the less likely it is to be visited by IUU fishing 
vessels. Countries with large numbers of conserva-
tion laws are less likely to tolerate IUU fishing in their 
waters and more likely to fine or arrest IUU fishers 
who offload their catch in their ports because of their 
commitment to wildlife protection.
Methods
Dependent variable
Number of visits by IUU fishing vessels by country In 2010, 
The PEW Charitable Trusts (2010), a non-profit organi-
zation that conducts research on marine conservation, 
among other things, published a report that examined 
the global movements of vessels that were known to 
carry out IUU fishing from January 2004 to December 
2009.1 The study recorded a total of 509 different vessel 
movements in 73 countries (or half of all coastal coun-
tries) during the study period2. This research uses the 
total number of visits by IUU fishing vessels to countries’ 
ports of entry. Ports of entry include canals, strait pas-
sages, anchorages, marinas, and ports.
Independent variables and their data sources
Concealability is measured by the number of vessels in 
port, the percent of a country’s ports that are within the 
top 125 ports in the world in total cargo volume, and the 
value of fish imports and exports.
The number of marine species within the country’s 
waters that are highly commercial internationally and the 
1 The PEW Charitable Trusts used multiple data sources to create the 
list of IUU fishing vessels and to monitor their movements. According to 
their report (PEW Charitable Trusts 2010), “the movement data on IUU-
listed vessels gathered in this research from across a range of publicly avail-
able sources is the most comprehensive compilation of its kind” (p. 8). The 
report explains the methodology and its limitations in depth.
2 This research excludes Taiwan from the analyses, as many independent 
variables were only available for China and IUU fishing vessels only visited 
Taiwan three times during the study period.
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quality of its port infrastructure indicate the convenience 
of offloading the catch at that country’s ports.
To measure the level of fisheries monitoring, control 
and surveillance, we used the country’s scores on illegal 
fishing, catch inspection schemes, observer schemes, 
vessel monitoring schemes, and control of access to stop 
illegal fishing.
The indicators of the country’s governance are the level 
of political stability and the absence of violence and ter-
rorism, the effectiveness of government in general, and 
the control of corruption.
Finally, the construct wildlife protection regulation 
encompasses the number of environmental protection 
and conservation treaties and conventions a country 
belongs to, the percentage of its territorial waters that are 
marine protected areas, and its environmental sustain-
ability coefficient.
Table 1 lists and describes all the independent variables 
used in this study and indicates their data sources, which 
are discussed briefly below.
This research uses a total of eight sources to draw data 
on the independent variables:
  • University of the Aegean (Greece), Department of 
Product and Systems Design Engineering The Univer-
sity of the Aegean, an institution of higher education, 
offers different interdisciplinary graduate and post-
graduate programs. The Department of Product and 
Systems Design Engineering developed the http://
marinetraffic.com website as an academic project, 
which was designed to monitor real-time data on the 
daily movements of vessels across the world by using 
the Automatic-Identification System automated 
tracking system (University of the Aegean 2015; 
Marine Traffic 2015).
  • National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) 
NGA is a US-based intelligence and combat support 
agency that provides geospatial intelligence to first 
responders, intelligence professionals, warfighters, 
and policy makers. It is the primary federal agency 
that provides geospatial intelligence for the Depart-
ment of Defense and the US Intelligence Commu-
nity. The Agency works with a network of over 400 
governmental agencies and commercial establish-
ments to provide geospatial information on geo-
graphically referenced activities on Earth (NGA 
2015).
  • American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) The 
AAPA is a trade organization representing more than 
130 public port authorities in the US, Canada, Latin 
America, and the Caribbean. The organization is 
comprised of 350 corporate and 200 associate mem-
bers, and engages in the promotion of issues related 
to trade, transportation, and environment, as well as 
port development and operations (AAPA 2015).
  • United Nations, Fisheries and Agriculture Organiza-
tion (UN FAO) Established in 1943, the UN FAO is 
the permanent United Nations organization dealing 
with the issues of food and agriculture (FAO 2015). 
Its Fisheries and Aquaculture Department deals with 
promoting sustainable development and use of fish-
eries and aquaculture resources (FAO Fisheries and 
Aquaculture 2015).
  • University of British Columbia, Fisheries Centre (UBC 
Fisheries Centre) The UBC Fisheries Centre is the 
fisheries research arm of the University of British 
Columbia focused on promoting multidisciplinary 
studies on marine ecosystems, and promoting col-
laborations with governments, non-governmental 
organizations, and maritime communities (UBC, 
Fisheries Centre 2015). The Centre’s http://seaaroun-
dusproject.org project was an initiative, in collabo-
ration with the PEW Charitable Trusts, launched to 
study the impact of fisheries on the marine ecosys-
tems globally and to offer solutions through provid-
ing data and analyses, as well as conducting research 
on global fisheries (The Sea Around Us 2015).
  • World Economic Forum (WEF) The WEF is an inter-
national institution devoted to promoting political, 
business, and academic cooperation among countries 
to improve the state of the world. The Forum works 
closely with international organizations to identify 
current and emerging challenges these countries face 
and to devise solutions (WEF 2015).
  • The World Bank Group (WBG) The WBG is a fam-
ily of five international institutions that provide 
financial assistance to developing economies around 
the world through low-interest loans, zero- to low-
interest credits, and grants. The WBG also engages in 
research and analysis, and provides policy advice and 
technical assistance to developing economies (WBG 
2015).
  • The United Nations (UN) Established in 1945, the UN 
is an intergovernmental organization devoted to pro-
moting peace and security in the world, and building 
cooperation among member states (of which there 
are 193) to work together on solving international 
problems, human rights issues, and international 
conflicts (UN 2015).
Control variable
Country Development Classification The UN World Eco-
nomic Development Prospects (WEDP) classifies all 
countries into three categories: developed economies, 
economies in transition, and developing economies, 
based solely on their level of economic development. 
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According to a 2009 UN WEDP Report (UN 2009), 20 of 
the countries included in this study are considered devel-
oped economies, 4 are economies in transition (Albania, 
Montenegro, Russia and Ukraine), and 48 are developing 
economies (see “Appendix 1”). For the purposes of this 
analysis, this variable was dichotomized to reflect two 
larger groups: ‘developed economies’ and ‘developing 
economies or economies in transition’.
Analytical approach
Two distinct analyses were performed as part of this 
research. First, a T test analysis was conducted to com-
pare developed and developing economies on the num-
ber of visits by IUU fishing vessels made to their ports 
and on all independent variables. All five hypotheses 
presented in this research were tested by using a nega-
tive binomial regression analysis to determine what vari-
ables influenced the number of visits a country received 
by IUU fishing vessels.
Results
Developing economies experience a higher degree of 
IUU fishing in their waters. Developed economies score 
significantly higher for all variables measuring conceal-
ability and convenience of offloading illegal catch in their 
ports. Their governance scores, the level of monitoring of 
fisheries, and the extent of protection of wildlife are also 
significantly higher. Contrary to what was anticipated, 
developed and developing economies did not differ sig-
nificantly in the number of visits made by IUU fishing 
vessels (Table 2).
Multivariate analyses were performed to determine 
what factors influenced IUU fishing vessels’ choice to 
offload their catch in a particular country. Given the sam-
ple size (72 countries), and the collinearity between the 
variables included in each construct, principal compo-
nents analysis was used to combine related variables into 
factors for constructs with 3 or more variables. Details 
of the analysis can be found in “Appendix 2”. Four con-
structs were converted into factors: concealability, fisher-
ies MCS, governance, and wildlife protection regulation.
Negative binomial regression was chosen for the multi-
variate analyses due to two important characteristics of 
the dependent variable: (a) data were actual counts of the 
number of IUU fishing vessel visits to the countries, and 
(b) data were over-dispersed. Missing data for the factors 
“fisheries MCS” and “wildlife protection regulation” 
reduced the sample size beyond acceptable ratios.3 For 
this reason, the analysis was performed with and without 
these predictors, with very similar results (see “Appendix 
3 The inclusion of both predictors reduced the sample size to 35 countries 
(48.6 % of the total sample). Including either one of the two predictors still 
reduced the sample size to below 75 % of the original sample.
3” for a comparison of both models). Table 3 displays the 
final model without “fisheries MCS” and “wildlife protec-
tion regulation.”
The difference between developed and developing 
economies on the number of visits by IUU fishing ves-
sels was not statistically significant. That was confirmed 
by the bivariate, as well as multivariate analyses. The UN 
country development classification to which a country 
belongs (developed vs. developing or in transition) was 
not significantly associated with the number of visits by 
IUU fishing vessels. The three predictors that did explain 
why such vessels prefer to offload their catch in some 
countries versus others were concealability, quality of 
port infrastructure, and governance.
As expected, concealability and quality of port infra-
structure are positively related to the number of visits 
to a country by IUU fishing vessels, while governance 
is negatively associated with it. According to Table  3, a 
unit increase in quality of port infrastructure is expected 
to double the number of visits, and a unit increase in 
concealability is associated with a 55  % increase in vis-
its, while holding all other variables in the model con-
stant. On the contrary, each unit increase in governance 
is expected to decrease the number of IUU fishing ves-
sel visits by 57  %, holding all other predictors constant. 
The overall model explains 6.8  % of the variance in the 
dependent variable.
Discussion
IUU fishing vessels are more likely to visit countries in 
which they can enter and leave the port inconspicuously, 
thereby reducing the risk of detection. Countries where 
the infrastructure of ports facilitates the transfer of catch 
to markets are more convenient to offload illegally caught 
fish and move it to markets without being caught. Con-
cealability and quality of port infrastructure are variables 
of a situational nature that structure decision making by 
IUU fishing vessels. They indicate that countries with 
higher volumes of general commercial flow, and better 
transportation networks in their ports, are more likely to 
be visited by IUU fishing vessels. This is particularly rele-
vant for developed economies, as these countries have an 
average of 8 times more vessel traffic and between 13 and 
14 times more volume of import and export than devel-
oping economies. Additionally, the port infrastructure 
of developed economies is, on average, 1.35 times better 
than that of the developing economies (see Table 2).
While the level of economic development does not 
seem to play a role in where IUU fishing vessels’ decide 
to offload their catch, the stability and effectiveness of 
the country’s government does. Crime is more likely to 
happen and go unnoticed or unpunished in countries at 
war, that are politically unstable, or where corruption is 
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rampant, because, in those situations, the risk of detec-
tion and fear of consequences, if caught, are greatly 
diminished. Developing economies disproportionately 
suffer from these governance problems; therefore, it is 
likely that, when given the choice, IUU fishing vessels will 
most likely opt for the country with weaker governance.
One limitation of this research is that it was not pos-
sible to run separate multivariate models for developed 
and developing economies due to the sample size and the 
amount of missing data for some of the independent vari-
ables. Such analyses would have helped determine what 
specific factors influenced IUU fishing vessels’ decision 
to offload their illegal catch in each of the two groups 
of countries. Second, data on the independent variables 
were not always available for the time period during 
Table 2 Comparing developed and developing economies
Italic values indicate significant results
For the purposes of this study, the term “economies” as used by the UN (2009) refers to “countries”
a Means are reported for all normally distributed continuous measures. Medians are reported for non-normally distributed continuous and ordinal measures
b All non-normally distributed continuous and ordinal measures: Mann–Whitney test (one-tailed; except “Number of visits of IUU fishing vessels”: two-tailed); 
normally distributed continuous measures: independent-samples T test (one-tailed)
c Non-normally distributed variable
Variables Developed economiesa
n = 20
Developing economies  
or in transition
n = 52
Sig.b Effect size (r) N
Number of visits of IUU fishing vesselsc 5 3 0.366 0.17 72
Concealability
Vessels in portc 407 52 0.000 0.50 71
% ports within top 125 ports in cargo volumec 15 % or less 0 0.023 0.23 72
Value fish importsc 1,390,025 97,636 0.000 0.51 72
Value fish exportsc 1,590,743 121,364 0.000 0.43 72
Convenience
Marine species commercial internationally 15 5 0.011 0.27 71
Quality port infrastructure 5.26 3.89 0.000 0.57 60
Fisheries MCS
Illegal fishing in the country’s waters 5.75 7.31 0.014 0.34 42
Catch inspection schemes 5.53 3.35 0.001 0.51 42
Observer schemes 4.69 2.08 0.000 0.55 42
Vessel monitoring schemes 5.75 3.40 0.003 0.44 42
Control of access to stop illegal fishing 4.56 3.35 0.032 0.29 42
Governance
Political stability 0.68 −0.43 0.000 0.64 72
Government effectiveness 1.34 −0.27 0.000 0.79 72
Control of corruption 1.33 −0.39 0.000 0.76 72
Wildlife protection regulation
# treaties and conventionsc 43 22 0.000 0.61 68
% marine protected areasc 14.05 2.75 0.000 0.42 70
Environmental sustainability 1.06 0.95 0.000 0.69 62
Table 3 Negative binomial regression on  the number 
of visits by IUU fishing vessels to a country
Italic values indicate significant results
B (SE) Sig. IRR 95 % CI
Country develop-
ment classification
0.073 (0.361) 0.841 1.075 [-0.636, 0.781]
Log # commercial 
marine species
0.045 (0.259) 0.861 1.046 [-0.462, 0.553]
Quality of port infra-
structure
0.738 (0.184) 0.000 2.091 [0.377, 1.099]
Concealability 0.439 (0.180) 0.015 1.551 [0.087, 0.791]
Governance −0.849 (0.279) 0.002 0.428 [-1.394, -0.303]
Constant −1.499 (0.942) 0.111 0.223 [-3.346, 0.347]
Pseudo R2 0.068***
N 59
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which the data on the dependent variable were collected 
(2004–2009). However, every effort has been made to use 
2009 data whenever possible. Third, while the use of sec-
ondary data for our study has obvious advantages (access 
to a variety of data that would be impossible to collect 
due to time and money constraints, among others), our 
analyses are limited by the quality of the data gathered by 
other institutions. For this reason, only data collected by 
reputable agencies were deemed appropriate for inclu-
sion in this research. Finally, the multivariate model dis-
cussed here only explains about 7 % of the variance in the 
dependent variable. However, models with small pseudo 
r-square values are not uncommon in criminal justice 
research (e.g. in Yu and Maxfield 2014, pseudo r-square 
ranges 7–9  %; in Stewart et  al. 2004, pseudo r-square 
ranges 3–17  %). Given the paucity of research on this 
specific topic, this study constitutes a first step toward 
understanding what factors influence IUU fishing vessels’ 
choice of country to offload their catch.
Future analyses could extend this study by using differ-
ent methods and variables as new data become available. 
Another avenue for research would be to compare the 72 
countries that were visited by IUU fishing vessels (that 
were examined in this research) to the remaining coastal 
countries that were not visited, to understand the differ-
ences between these two groups.
Conclusion
 While developing economies experience higher level 
of IUU fishing in their waters (Black 2007), our findings 
indicate that there is no difference in the number of times 
IUU fishing vessels visit ports in developed versus devel-
oping economies. This suggests that the offload of ille-
gally caught fish is actually a global problem that does not 
disproportionately affect developing economies.
Rather, it is situational factors that play a key role in 
IUU fishing vessels’ decisions to offload in one coun-
try rather than another. These vessels prefer to  visit 
those countries that facilitate an inconspicuous entry 
into the port and an easy disposal process for the 
catch, which reduce the chances of detection. Such 
ease of entry and disposal can take different forms. In 
developed economies, higher volumes of fish imports 
and exports and better infrastructure offer greater 
camouflage. For this reason, the countries with the 
most active ports in each region should be subject to 
special monitoring, as they constitute points of entry 
of illegally caught fish into the area. Some ways of 
blocking the opportunities afforded by those coun-
tries include the implementation of the 2005 FAO 
Port State Model Scheme, which would require that 
fishing vessels provide prior notice for port access 
that would include such information as vessel iden-
tification, fishing license, and information on catch 
and fishing trip, among other things (FAO 2007). This 
agreement reduces anonymity and makes it more dif-
ficult to offload illegal catch without detection, but 
should be strictly implemented in all countries and re-
evaluated on a regular basis for maximum effective-
ness. An increase in general port activity in a country 
should lead to enhanced security measures to detect 
and detain IUU fishing vessels, and prevention efforts 
should concentrate on the busiest countries.
In turn, in developing economies, political instabil-
ity and high levels of corruption facilitate illegal activity 
in general, including the offload of illegal catch at port. 
If the existing mechanisms of formal surveillance can-
not be trusted, other mechanisms could be put in place. 
External monitoring could be conducted by international 
organizations that operate independently from the coun-
try’s governmental administration; and establishing sur-
veillance and reporting practices among the community 
and the fishermen could help prevent offloading of illegal 
catch. Timor-Leste, for example, provides local fisher-
men with free GPS units that they can use to both anony-
mously report IUU fishing and send a distress signal in 
case of emergency. The information on location, date, 
and time of an IUU fishing report is automatically sent to 
maritime authorities for follow-up (IMCSN 2012).
Second, our results highlight that studying all the dif-
ferent steps that lead to the successful completion of a 
crime through, for example, script analysis, is essential 
to fully understanding how the crime is committed and 
how it should be addressed and prevented. In this case, 
although the act of illegally removing fish from a coun-
try’s waters does affect developing economies to a greater 
extent, countries’ level of economic development is not a 
determining factor for IUU fishing vessels when deciding 
where to offload their catch. Other factors intervene, and 
learning about them in greater detail can help disrupt the 
final step of the script of IUU fishing, thereby making it 
more difficult for these vessels to dispose of their catch.
IUU fishing is a significant global problem. It affects 
the marine ecosystem and disrupts the livelihoods of 
millions of people who depend on it for survival. Envi-
ronmental criminology holds great promise for this issue 
because it helps understand the IUU fishing process in 
detail, while offering crime prevention interventions 
for every step and every context in which IUU fishing 
occurs. It is with this conviction that we hope to stimu-
late criminological interest in the topic and encourage 
criminologists to offer their training and skills to ensure 
that future generations conserve and continue to benefit 
from marine resources.
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See Table 4.
Table 4 Countries visited by  IUU fishing vessels 
between 2004 and 2009, by UN economic grouping







































Congo, D.R. of 1
Costa Rica 3
Table 4 continued



































United Arab Emirates 2
Venezuela 1
Vietnam 1





Table 5 Principal components analysis of the constructs
a “Illegal fishing score” was reversed prior to its inclusion in the Fisheries MCS factor
Factor Items Factor loadings Communality
Concealability
N = 71
# vessels in port 0.912 0.832
% ports within 125 top ports 0.689 0.475
Value of fish imports 0.883 0.779
Value of fish exports 0.850 0.722
Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin = 0.790 Eigenvalue = 2.81
Bartlett’s test = p < 0.001 % of Variance = 70.2 Determinant = 0.127
Fisheries monitoring, control, and  
surveillance
N = 42
Illegal fishing scorea 0.727 0.529
Catch inspection schemes 0.900 0.810
Observer schemes 0.797 0.636
Vessel monitoring schemes 0.844 0.712
Control of access to stop illegal fishing 0.857 0.735
Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin = 0.834 Eigenvalue = 3.42
Bartlett’s test = p < 001 % of Variance = 68.4 Determinant = 0.059
Governance
N = 72
Political stability 0.858 0.736
Government effectiveness 0.948 0.899
Control of corruption 0.965 0.931
Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin = 0.675 Eigenvalue = 2.57
Bartlett’s test = p < 0.001 % of Variance = 85.5 Determinant = 0.058
Wildlife protection regulation
N = 57
# treaties and conventions for the protection of the environment 0.791 0.626
% territorial waters that are marine protected areas 0.794 0.630
Environmental sustainability 0.797 0.636
Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin = 0.676 Eigenvalue = 1.89
Bartlett’s test = p < 0.001 % of Variance = 63.0 Determinant = 0.581
Table 6 Negative binomial regression on  number of  visits by  IUU fishing vessels to  the country: comparison of  two 
models




Without fisheries MCS and wildlife  
protection regulation
B (SE) IRR B (SE) IRR
Country development classification −0.551 (0.595) 0.576 0.073 (0.361) 1.075
Log # commercial marine species −0.430 (0.408) 0.651 0.045 (0.259) 1.046
Quality of port infrastructure 0.702 (0.233)** 2.017 0.738 (0.184)*** 2.091
Concealability 0.514 (0.230)* 1.671 0.439 (0.180)* 1.551
Fisheries MCS 0.069 (0.225) 1.072 – – –
Governance −1.356 (0.426)*** 0.258 −0.849 (0.279)** 0.428
Wildlife protection regulation 0.279 (0.260) 1.321 – – –
Constant 0.124 (1.380) 1.132 −1.499 (0.942) 0.223
Pseudo R2 0.086** 0.068***
N 35 59
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